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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOUTHEASTERN STATES’
INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF EXPORTERS
ABSTRACT
Exporters are vital to the health of the U.S. economy as well as to individual state economies. 
As such, this study analyzes the export-related provisions of the southeastern states’ income tax 
laws and proposes tax policy changes that could potentially improve the tax environment for 
exporters while enhancing the overall economic environment in those states.
In order to develop and support tax policy recommendations relating to state’s tax treatment 
of exporters, statistics that highlight the importance of exports to the domestic economy are 
reviewed. In addition, a summary of Federal tax law incentives available to exporters is provided 
along with several Treasury Department studies that estimate the impact the federal tax law 
incentives have had on the volume of exports. Also, key issues under state income tax laws 
regarding the treatment of export transactions are highlighted while providing a comparative 
analysis of the southeastern states’ treatment of export transactions using foreign sales 
corporations (FSC).
The results of this study demonstrate not only that disparity among the southeastern states 
treatment of exporters exists, but also that the method used by state governments to tax 
FSCs could impact the extent to which corporations find it desirable to export their goods from a 
particular state. Based on these findings, the authors suggest the adoption of administrative pricing 
rules (similar to the rules in place for Federal tax purposes) for FSCs by states not currently 
allowing these rules, which would decrease the effective tax rate on export sales. The reduction 
in taxes could ultimately provide an incentive for domiciled corporations to increase exporting 
activities, contributing to increased domestic jobs and overall economic activity.
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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOUTHEASTERN STATES’
INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF EXPORTERS
I. Introduction
Exports are vital to the health of the U.S. economy. Similarly, sales of goods and services 
abroad are important to individual state economies. This study analyzes the export-related 
provisions of the southeastern states’ income tax laws and makes a policy recommendation for 
changes.
Following the introduction, Section II briefly reviews statistics that highlight the importance 
of exports to the domestic economy. Section III examines the federal tax law incentives to 
export including the large foreign sales corporation, small foreign sales corporation, shared 
foreign sales corporation, interest-charge domestic international sales corporation, and sales 
source rules. Section IV reviews several Treasury Department studies that estimate the impact 
the federal tax law incentives have had on the volume of exports.
Section V highlights some of the key issues under state income tax laws regarding the 
treatment of export transactions. Section VI provides a comparative analysis of the 
southeastern states’ treatment of export transactions using foreign sales corporations (FSC). 
Section VII makes recommendations for states’ policies toward exports, and Section VIII 
provides a summary and conclusion.
II. Economic Desirability of U.S. Exports
The United States actively encourages the export sale of goods and services through 
sundry programs providing loans, credit guarantees, insurance, and marketing information. 
Some programs specifically target small businesses, where much of the potential for export 
growth lies.1 There are many reasons why the federal government promotes exports, but the
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single most important reason is that sales abroad expand the domestic economy. Estimates 
credit exports with 7.4 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP).2 In the early 1990s, 
growth in U.S. exports accounted for 80 percent of the increase in GDP.3 The growth in exports 
has also led to higher employment and better paying jobs. The federal government estimates 
that every $1 billion in U.S. exports supports 19,000 domestic jobs. On average, these export- 
related jobs pay 17 percent more than other domestic jobs.4
Since increased exports translate into higher production levels and employment, some 
state governments pour significant resources into efforts to stimulate exports. A good example 
of these activities is provided by Florida’s export finance corporations. The state government 
establishes and capitalizes these export finance corporations to facilitate exports from the state. 
The purposes of export finance corporations are to assist exporters through direct loans, loan 
guarantees, investments, trade counseling, and technical assistance and to cooperate with 
other organizations and agencies in promoting export trade.5 Florida's Division of International 
Trade and Development in its Department of Commerce also promotes and facilitates exports. 
Among other things, this division schedules and conducts trade delegations and missions, 
provides technical assistance through counseling and seminars, coordinates resources 
available to U.S. exporters, maintains trade data bases, and provides export financing.6 In 
short, this agency performs many of the same services as the U.S. Department of Commerce. 
The services, of course, should be more effective in promoting Floridian exports, since they 
specifically focus on goods and services produced within the state.
III. Federal Tax Law Incentives
The promotion of exports at the Federal level has a long tradition. In 1971, Congress 
enacted legislation that provided a tax benefit to encourage U.S. exports. The incentive 
assumed the form of a tax-exempt entity called a domestic international sales corporation
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(DISC). Though the DISC was exempt from federal income tax, its shareholders were taxable 
on dividends received. Each year, a DISC generally was deemed to distribute one-half of its 
export profits even when no profits were actually distributed. Thus, only one-half of the annual 
export profits earned through a DISC generally were taxable. The untaxed profits were tax 
deferred until actually distributed, the DISC was liquidated, the DISC ceased to qualify as a 
DISC, the shareholders sold their DISC stock, or the DISC election was terminated or revoked 7
The DISC’S deferral tax benefit was significant. The number of DISC elections rapidly 
climbed from 3,439 in 1972 to 18,717 in 1984 suggesting that many exporters recognized and 
used the Federal DISC incentive.8 More revealing of the DISC program’s success is the 
number of federal income tax returns filed each year. In 1976, DISC returns totaled 6,431.® By 
1983, the number of DISC returns had swelled to 9,663.10 This 50 percent growth translates 
into a six percent annual increase. Similarly, the aggregate deferred income of all DISCs at the 
end of 1976 and 1984 was $6,946 trillion and $22.76 trillion, respectively.11 This 228 percent 
increase translates into an annual growth rate of 16 percent.
Perhaps the DISC program was a bit too successful. Several major trading partners (e.g., 
the European Economic Community) complained that the DISC deferral was an illegal export 
subsidy that violated the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In response to 
GATT complaints, the United States replaced the DISC with other export incentives, namely the 
foreign sales corporation (FSC) and the interest-charge domestic international sales corporation 
(ICD). These new provisions were enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1984. Since 
relatively few U.S. exporters use ICDs (less than five percent of exports through FSCs),12 the 
focus of this analysis will be on the Federal and state tax treatments of the more extensively 
utilized FSC.
Interest among U.S. exporters in FSCs was not as great as for the pre-1985 DISCs. 
Active FSCs totaled 2,341, 2,900, and 2,613 in 1985, 1986, and 1987, respectively.13 The
3
decline in 1987 was presumably due to the drop in overall tax rates included in the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986. The exempt FSC income was $1.975 billion, $2.027 billion, and $2.111 billion over 
the same three-year period.14 The small upward trend in FSC elections during the early years 
and the modest 3.4 percent annual growth in exempt income suggest that, initially, many U.S. 
exporters were not convinced the FSC benefits outweighed the FSC costs.
Despite the lessened interest in FSCs vis-a-vis pre-1985 DISCs, the U.S. Treasury 
Department estimated that the FSC program increased U.S. exports by $1.54 billion, $1.52 
billion, and $1.2 billion in 1985, 1986, and 1987, respectively. These estimated increases were 
seven-tenths of one percent of total U.S. exports in 1985 and 1986 and one-half of a percent of 
total U.S. exports in 1987.15 In addition to the increase in U.S. exports, the Treasury 
Department estimated that the FSC program indirectly reduced dependence on U.S. imports of 
goods and services, increased service exports, and increased income from U.S. investments 
abroad.16 The revenue cost of the FSC program was estimated to be $790 million, $811 million, 
and $760 million in 1985, 1986, and 1987, respectively.17
The FSC can operate on either a buy-sell or a commission basis. Most operate on a 
commission basis, receiving fees from their parent companies in return for facilitating export 
sales. In addition to this variation, a FSC can be established as either a large FSC (LFSC) or a 
small FSC (SFSC). More than one U.S. company can export through a single LFSC or SFSC. 
This latter arrangement reduces the maintenance and operational expenses of each exporter 
and is known as a shared FSC.
The remainder of this section reviews the tax provisions applicable to the LFSC, SFSC, 
and shared FSC . In addition, we discuss the sales sourcing rules and their implications for 
export transactions.
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A. Large Foreign Sales Corporations
U.S. exporters with substantial foreign sales can benefit significantly by creating a LFSC. 
The tax benefit takes the form of an exemption ranging generally between 15 and 30 percent. 
Assuming a federal tax rate of 34 percent, the effective tax rate on export profits using a FSC 
ranges between 23.8 and 28.9 percent.18 In addition, grouping export transactions and using 
marginal costing techniques sometimes can be used to enhance the FSC tax benefit.19
Many of the provisions reviewed below are equally applicable to LFSCs and SFSCs. For 
those provisions, the more general term “FSC” is used. Notable exceptions are the foreign 
management, foreign sales participation, and foreign direct cost requirements, which apply only 
to LFSCs. Provisions peculiar to the SFSC are discussed later.
1. Foreign Presence and Other Organization Requirements
A FSC is a corporation organized in a qualified foreign country or U.S. possession.20 
More than 30 locations outside the United States qualify.21 However, nearly all FSCs are 
formed in Barbados, Bermuda, Guam, Jamaica, and the U.S. Virgin Islands because these 
jurisdictions impose low or no taxes on FSC profits.22 In addition to foreign organization, a FSC 
must have a foreign office where it maintains a permanent set of books and other financial 
records. Specified corporate records also must be kept at some location within the United 
States.23
Federal tax law allows no more than 25 parties to own stock in a FSC.24 Though no 
minimum capital is specified under U.S. law, a FSC can have no outstanding preferred stock.25 
The FSC’s board of directors must include at least one individual who is not a U.S. resident.26 
Finally, a FSC cannot be a member of a controlled group of corporations that includes an ICD, 
and the foreign corporation must make a timely election to be a FSC.27
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2. Export Transactions
The following five broad categories of export transactions qualify for the FSC exemption:
1. The sale, exchange, or other disposition of export property;
2. The lease or rental of export property for use abroad;
3. Services related and subsidiary to transactions in categories 1 or 2 above;
4. Engineering and architectural sen/ices for construction projects abroad; and
5. Managerial services for unrelated FSCs or DISCs geared toward enhancing the 
exemption or deferral, respectively, of these unrelated entities.
Only FSCs that receive at least 50 percent of their gross receipts from transactions in
categories 1 through 3 during the taxable year are entitled to FSC benefits from rendering
managerial services described in category 5.28
Notwithstanding the five categories above, the following types of transactions do not 
qualify for FSC benefits:
1. The properties or services sold are for ultimate use within the United States;
2. A federal law or regulation requires the U.S. government or one of its 
instrumentalities to use this type of property or service (e.g., made in America);
3. The transaction involves a subsidy from the United States or one of its 
instrumentalities;
4. The sales proceeds are from another FSC in the same controlled group of 
corporations as the FSC receiving payment; and
5. The amounts received represent investment income or carrying charges.29
Most qualified transactions involve export property. To constitute export property, all of 
the following requirements must be met:
1. Some party other than a FSC must manufacture, produce, grow, or extract the 
item within the United States;30
2. The item must be held primarily for sale, rental, or lease in the ordinary course of 
business for direct consumption, use, or other disposition abroad;
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3. No more than half of the item’s fair market value can be attributed to materials or 
parts imported into the United States;
4. A FSC cannot lease or rent the item to a related corporation;
5. With some exceptions, the item cannot be an intangible asset used in a 
manufacturing process or marketing;
6. The item cannot be oil, gas, or a primary product from either oil or gas;
7. The item cannot be on the list of products whose export is prohibited or curtailed 
under federal law to protect the U.S. economy;
8. The item cannot be unprocessed softwood timber; and
9. The item cannot be property that the U.S. President has declared to be in short 
supply.31
3. Foreign Management
To generate export profits eligible for the tax benefit, a LFSC must be managed outside 
the United States.32 Management abroad includes three requirements that must be satisfied 
throughout the taxable year. Failure to satisfy any one of the requirements means that the 
LFSC forfeits the benefit of the tax exemption for that year.
First, all formally-convened board of director and shareholder meetings must be held 
outside the United States. Whether meetings must be held and other meeting-related issues 
depend on the local law of the jurisdiction where the LFSC is organized.33 Second, the LFSC's 
principal bank account must be maintained in a qualified foreign country or U.S. possession.34 
Third, all cash dividends, legal and accounting fees, and salaries of board members and 
officers must be paid from a bank account maintained abroad.35
4. Foreign Economic Processes
For a given transaction to qualify for the tax exemption, both a sales participation test and 
a direct cost test must be met.36 Both are transaction-based. Thus, the failure of one
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transaction to qualify does not preclude the tax benefit on another export transaction in the 
same taxable year.
The tax exemption is allowed only for export transactions in which the LFSC or its agent 
participates outside the United States. For the participation to occur outside the United States, 
the sales participation must be initiated abroad.37 For this purpose, sales participation means 
solicitation, negotiation, or contracting.38 Thus, only one of these three activities need be 
initiated abroad for the related transaction to qualify for FSC tax benefits.
The direct cost test focuses on five activities involving expenses:
1. Advertising and sales promotion;
2. Processing orders and making delivery arrangements;
3. Delivering the export property to the customer;
4. Determining and transmitting the invoice or statement of account and receiving 
payment; and
5. Assuming credit risk.39
For a given export transaction, the direct cost test can be satisfied in two alternative ways. 
First, the test is met if at least half of the aggregate direct costs the LFSC incurs in the five 
categories above are foreign direct costs.40 Second, the test is met if at least 85 percent of the 
direct costs the LFSC incurs in any two of the five categories above (tested separately) are 
foreign direct costs.41
5. Exemption Benefit
Most FSCs operate on a commission basis. However, the calculation of the tax benefit is 
easiest to understand in the context of a buy-sell FSC in which a related supplier (usually a sole 
corporate owner) sells a product to its FSC which, in turn, sells the product to a foreign
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consumer. Therefore, the discussion that follows assumes a buy-sell FSC. The results are the 
same for both forms of FSCs. Generally, two steps are involved.
First, a transfer price between the FSC and its related supplier must be determined. The 
transfer price is the mechanism that allocates the export profit between the FSC and its related 
supplier. Three methods exist for calculating the transfer price:
1. The combined taxable income method allocates profit to the FSC in an amount 
equal to 23 percent of the net profit from the export sale (i.e., the combined 
taxable income of the FSC and its related supplier).
2. The foreign trading gross receipts method allocates profit to the FSC in an amount 
equal to the lesser of 1.83 percent of export receipts from the sale to the foreign 
consumer or 46 percent of the net profit from the export sale.
3. The arm’s length method allocates profit to the FSC based on the amount 
unrelated parties would charge on the same transaction.42
To maximize the tax benefit, it is desirable to select the method that allocates the largest profit
to the FSC. Most U.S. exporters with FSCs use one or both of the first two methods, which are
known as administrative pricing methods.43 Under these two methods, the profit allocation to
the FSC is used to “back into" the transfer price. To use administrative pricing, the FSC or its
agent must perform the three sales participation activities and the five direct cost activities
discussed above.44 For this purpose, it does not matter where these eight activities are
performed.
Second, the tax exemption is determined based on the transfer price calculated in the first 
step above. When administrative pricing is used and a corporation owns the FSC, the FSC can 
exclude 15/23 of its allocated gross profit.45 Specifically, the transfer price reduces the export 
receipts from the foreign consumer to obtain gross export profit (or foreign trade income). The 
FSC exemption is 15/23 of the gross export profit. Thus, when the combined taxable income 
pricing method is used, the FSC tax benefit is always 15 percent (i.e., 23 percent of the profit 
allocated to the FSC times 15/23), which results in a 28.9 percent effective tax rate (i.e., 85
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percent of the 34 percent statutory rate). The maximum FSC tax benefit under the foreign 
trading gross receipts method is 30 percent (i.e., 46 percent of the profit allocated to the FSC 
times 15/23), which results in a 23.8 percent effective tax rate (i.e., 70 percent of the 34 percent 
statutory rate).
Otherwise allowable deductions properly allocated or apportioned to the FSC exemption 
are non-deductible.46 Similarly, a FSC generally is denied a foreign tax credit for foreign taxes 
paid on export income.47 This explains why they tend to be located in the Caribbean countries, 
which do not tax FSCs or tax them very lightly.
Most FSCs have only corporate shareholders and use only administrative pricing rules to 
determine their tax benefit. When these FSCs remit their export profits as dividends, the 
corporate shareholders must include the profits in their gross incomes. However, the gross 
income is entirely offset with a 100 percent dividend received deduction.48 Thus, dividend 
distributions received from a FSC generally do not increase the federal income tax liability of 
the recipients; the tax impact is determined entirely at the FSC level on these exports.
B. Small Foreign Sales Corporations
A less costly alternative to the LFSC is provided through the SFSC. However, the 
drawback to the SFSC is that only $5 million of export sales qualify for the tax exemption each 
year.49 To qualify as a SFSC, a corporation must meet all the foreign presence and other 
organization requirements discussed previously for LFSCs, but with two differences. First, the 
election must state that the corporation wishes to be a SFSC. Second, the corporation cannot 
be a member of a controlled group of corporations that includes a LFSC.50
Unlike a LFSC, a SFSC need not meet the foreign management and foreign economic 
processes requirements to generate export receipts qualifying for the tax exemption.51 Thus, 
shareholder and board meetings can take place in the United States, the principal bank account
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can be maintained anywhere, FSC disbursements need not come from the principal bank 
account, no sales participation activities have to be initiated abroad, and no direct costs need 
be incurred abroad. In short, the SFSC is less complex and less expensive to operate than the 
LFSC.
C. Shared Foreign Sales Corporations
A group of 25 or fewer unrelated U.S. companies can establish a single FSC through 
which to sell their goods and services abroad. To effectively operate a shared FSC it is 
necessary to establish and maintain separate transaction accounts for each company. The 
distributions to each company must be based on the amounts in the separate accounts.52
The primary advantage of a shared FSC is that it allows the participating exporters to 
share common expenses, thus, achieving economies of scale. However, only the costs of 
establishing and operating the FSC are shared among the separate exporters. Profits, trade 
secrets, and other financial information are not shared. The arrangement is particularly 
attractive for small companies that might otherwise decide not to export or that might not have 
sufficient export sales volume to justify using a solo FSC.
D. Impact of Sales Source Rules on Tax Benefit
The United States allows a tax credit for foreign income taxes that U.S. companies pay or 
accrue. Though export sales generally are not subject to foreign income taxes, all or some of 
the sales’ profit may be foreign source income. As noted below, foreign source income is an 
important component in calculating the foreign tax credit. Thus, the source of income rules can 
affect the after-tax return on export sales. After explaining the foreign tax credit mechanism, 
the impact of the source rules on export sales (both with and without a FSC) is examined.
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The United States taxes the worldwide income of its U.S. citizens, residents, and domestic 
corporations.53 Thus, the United States taxes both U.S. source and foreign source income of 
these taxpayers. However, U.S. taxpayers can claim a foreign tax credit for foreign income 
taxes paid or accrued during the taxable year.54 The purpose of the credit is to mitigate the 
effect of the same income being taxed twice-once by the United States (because of the U.S.’s 
worldwide jurisdiction) and once by a foreign country or U.S. possession.
The credit is permitted only against U.S. income taxes imposed on foreign source income. 
A formulary limitation prevents taxpayers from claiming the foreign tax credit against U.S. 
income taxes imposed on U.S. source income. The general limitation is expressed as follows:
.. ,. Foreign Source Taxable Income ,, 0 -r r. r ^  -,-issLimitation = —... .. T □—j------------- x U.S. Tax Before Credit55Worldwide Taxable Income
Foreign income taxes paid or accrued during the taxable year, which are known as creditable 
taxes, are not allowed as a credit to the extent they exceed the result of the limitation formula. 
The amounts disallowed are called excess credits. Excess credits can be carried back two 
taxable years and forward five taxable years.56 In each carryover year, the excess credit is 
summed with the creditable taxes for that year. This sum is subject to the result of the limitation 
formula in the carryover year. Excess credits that are not allowed during the two-year/five-year 
carryover period are lost.
Generally, a foreign effective tax rate higher than the prevailing effective tax rate in the 
United States results in excess credits. Since the substantial decrease in U.S. tax rates in 
1986, most domestic corporations with foreign operations (e.g., foreign subsidiaries, joint 
ventures, or branches) have excess credits.57 If not absorbed during the two-year/five-year 
carryover period, the credits are forfeited. One means of salvaging excess credits is to engage
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in foreign transactions that yield foreign source income (thus, increasing the numerator of the 
limitation formula) without incurring a foreign income tax. Exporting is a transaction that allows 
this type of tax planning.
The profit from the export sale of manufactured goods is partially U.S. source and partially 
foreign source income.58 The allocation of profit between these two source categories can be 
based on an independent factory price, if available.59 An independent factory price has been 
held not to exist in the absence of a foreign selling or distributing branch.60 When an 
independent factory price is not available, 50 percent of the income is sourced according to 
where the manufacturing occurs and 50 percent is sourced according to where the gross sales 
occur.61 Sales generally occur wherever title to goods pass, which depends primarily on the 
terms of sales contracts.62 Thus, when manufacturing occurs in the United States and sales 
contracts are structured so that title to goods transfers abroad, half of the export income is U.S. 
source and half is foreign source.
As noted above, the foreign source portion of the export income allows the taxpayer to 
offset the U.S. tax incurred with any excess credits it might possess. Thus, to the extent the 
taxpayer has excess credits from other foreign operations (e.g., foreign branches) that are 
expected to be lost, export transactions are one means of using the credits. In other words, the 
foreign source portion of the export income is subject to U.S. taxation (because of U.S. 
worldwide jurisdiction), but the U.S. tax is entirely offset with the excess credits that otherwise 
might be lost. In effect, only half of the export profit is taxable; the foreign source portion of the 
export profit is exempt. Thus, a U.S. taxpayer normally subject to a 34 percent U.S. tax rate is 
subject to an effective rate of 17 percent on its export transactions when it has excess credits 
that are expected to expire.
Because statutory provisions restrict the benefit derived from the source rules to 25 
percent when a FSC is used with the 23 percent administrative pricing rule,63 a U.S.
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Corporation with excess credits that otherwise will expire generally should not use a FSC for 
exporting. The rationale for this proposition follows. Since the FSC benefit is generally 15 
percent and the use of a FSC when the U.S. exporter has excess credits typically results in a 
40 percent benefit, a U.S. taxpayer otherwise subject to a 34 percent tax rate can only reduce 
the effective rate to 20.4 percent in this situation. On the other hand, the tax benefit of the 
source rules for exporters with excess credits when a FSC is not used is 50 percent, resulting in 
an effective rate of 17 percent.
IV. Impact of Federal Tax Legislation on Exports
By most measures, the DISC was very popular among U.S. exporters between 1971 and 
1985. The intent of the DISC legislation was to increase the volume of U.S. exports. Similarly, 
the purpose of the 1984 legislation replacing the DISC with the FSC (and ICD) was to continue 
the export incentive (albeit in GATT-proof form) to achieve national economic objectives. The 
relevant question, however, is not whether U.S. exporters took advantage of the tax incentives, 
but whether and to what extent these tax incentives were successful at a reasonable cost. 
More specifically, have the DISC and FSC programs been successful in increasing the volume 
of U.S. exports? Treasury Department reports, which are discussed below, generally conclude 
that the programs have been successful (i.e., they have promoted exports at a reasonable cost 
to U.S. taxpayers.). A study of the export sales source rule and its effect on U.S. exports is 
also examined below.
A. Pre-1985 DISC Effect on Exports
Annual Treasury Department reports examined the question of whether the DISC program 
did, in fact, increase export volume or supply. The conclusions of the eleventh annual report 
were similar to those in prior years. Based on estimated supply and demand price elasticities
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and an assumed effective tax rate of 40 percent, the Treasury estimated that the DISC program 
increased U.S. exports between $6 and $9.2 billion in 1982 and between $4.8 and $7.4 billion in 
1983.64 The estimated revenue cost associated with the increase in exports was $1.52 billion 
and $1.24 billion for 1982 and 1983, respectively.65 Thus, there were between $3.94 and $7.42 
of exports promoted for every dollar of forgone revenue for 1982 and between $3.87 and $5.97 
for 1983. These estimates reflected the initial, direct impact of the DISC deferral.
The Treasury also considered the impact of long-term factors on the volume of exports. 
Over time, the DISC program was expected to affect relative prices, capital flows, income, and 
rates of return. When the long-term factors were considered, the Treasury estimated that the 
total effect of the DISC program on exports was only two-thirds of the initial, direct impact.66
B. FSC Effect on Exports
Treasury used a standard trade model to estimate the impact of the FSC program on U.S. 
exports in the medium term. The model calculated trade effects for each of several industries. 
In each industry, the model estimated proportional changes in average export prices based on 
export supply and demand elasticities, volume of exports, cash flow benefit of FSC exemption, 
and exchange rate responses to shifts in trade.67 The model equations assumed that firms view 
taxes the same as other costs of doing business.68
The FSC program was estimated to increase aggregate U.S. exports by $1.5 billion, $1.5 
billion, and $1.2 billion in 1985, 1986, and 1987, respectively. In order of impact, the following 
industries had the largest increases in export volume: transportation equipment, nonelectrical 
machinery, and electrical machinery.69
To estimate the revenue cost of the FSC program, Treasury assumed effective corporate 
tax rates of 40 percent, 40 percent, and 36 percent for 1985, 1986, and 1987, respectively. It 
also assumed that the factors of production generating FSC exports would produce the same
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level of income without the FSC tax incentive. Based on these assumptions, Treasury 
estimated that the revenue cost of the FSC program was $790 million, $811 million, and $760 
million in 1985, 1986, and 1987, respectively. Thus, the exports promoted per dollar of 
foregone revenue were $1.90, $1.85, and $1.58 for 1985-87, respectively. Based on an 
effective corporate tax rate of 32 percent for subsequent years, Treasury projected revenue 
costs of $742 million, $850 million, $924 million, and $1,048 million for 1988 through 1991, 
respectively.70
C. Effect of Sourcing Rules on Exports
As discussed earlier, the effective tax rate of U.S. companies with excess foreign tax 
credits that export directly (i.e., without using a FSC) is generally half the effective rate that 
would otherwise apply. The lower effective tax rate is a result of the source rules for the sale of 
produced goods that often treats half the income as foreign source. The foreign source income 
increases the foreign tax credit limitation formula, which allows the excess credits to be 
absorbed. Thus, the current source rules sometimes are viewed as an incentive to export.
An alternative to the current sales source rule is an activity-based rule. An activity-based 
rule sources income according to where economic activity occurs. Treasury used IRS and 
Commerce Department data and an activity-based rule to treat all export income as from U.S. 
sources.71 If the alternative activity-based source rule is required in place of the current source 
rule, the change would result in no tax benefits to U.S. exporters with excess foreign tax credits.
The current sales source rule (vis-a-vis an activity-based rule) is estimated to increase 
annual U.S. exports in the medium term between zero and $4 billion; the best estimate of the 
increase is $1.7 billion. However, in the long term, Treasury expects the repeal of the current 
sales source rule and the accompanying decline in U.S. exports to be matched by a similar 
decline in U.S. imports. According to these calculations, the repeal of the current sales source
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rule should leave the balance of U.S. trade unaffected in the long term.72 For 1990, the revenue 
cost of the current sales source rules was $2,069 billion. In years after 1991, the revenue cost 
was expected to be lower.73
V. General Issues in State Taxation of Export Profits
All but a few states have a state corporate income tax. Usually the levy is called an 
income tax, but some states refer to it as a franchise, business profits, or license tax. Each 
state has its own determination of taxable income, but most states “piggyback” on the 
calculation of the federal income tax base, at least to some degree.
Even those states that piggyback on the federal definition of taxable income vary widely in 
their treatments of some provisions found in the federal income tax law. In particular, states 
often take different approaches to the income tax treatment of export transactions. Some 
states recognize FSCs and afford them benefits similar to those available under federal law. 
Other states provide their own alternative export incentives or no special treatment. This 
section discusses several of the more important export-related issues under state tax law.
A. Nexus
From a revenue perspective, nexus establishes a state government’s right to impose a 
tax. Nexus is the link between the entity and the state that gives the state a right to impose its 
tax. What constitutes nexus varies considerably from one state to another.
Entities incorporated within a state generally have nexus with that state, regardless of 
where business is actually conducted. At the same time, entities incorporated in one state can 
have nexus with other states. Similarly, a corporation organized in a foreign country or U.S. 
possession can have nexus with one or more of the 50 states.
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Two definitions of nexus have evolved over the years. Minimum nexus is a concept 
derived from the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution.74 Substantial nexus is based on 
the Constitution’s commerce clause and applies to interstate commerce activities.75
Minimum nexus exists whenever the state has provided benefits for which it can 
reasonably expect a return in the form of tax dollars.76 State benefits generally include 
intangible services such as the protection that the state’s laws provide and favorable business 
conditions. Thus, an entity that exploits a state’s economic market through interstate sales is 
said to have economic or due process nexus with that state. This type of nexus is sufficient 
jurisdiction for some types of taxes, such as a net worth tax on capital, but is insufficient for 
others, particularly a state income tax. For example, Public Law No. 86-272 prohibits a state 
from taxing the income of a corporation if its only business within the state consists of 
solicitation of orders for sales of tangible personal property that are sent outside the state for 
approval and are filled and shipped from outside the state.77
Interstate commerce activities cannot be taxed without commerce clause or substantial 
nexus. Thus, state taxes based on income require substantial nexus, which has been 
interpreted to mean a “physical presence” within the state.78 Substantial nexus usually involves 
financial capital in the state, owned or leased property in the state, employment of one or more 
persons in the state, or maintenance of an office or other fixed place of business in the state. 
However, there are several non-universal activities which are used by various states to 
determine nexus. These activities include, among others, software licensing, phone book 
listing, and intangible right licensing. Thus, listing a company in a telephone directory will 
trigger nexus in some states. Since state nexus rules vary considerably, careful examination of 
the universal and non-universal nexus-creating activities must be considered to determine 
whether the state has a legitimate right to tax a particular entity.
18
FSCs are organized outside the United States and generally sell products and services in 
foreign markets. FSCs generally do not own or lease property in the United States, neither do 
they usually have employees. Moreover, LFSCs must be managed abroad and must 
participate in some foreign economic processes. First impressions, therefore, might suggest 
that most FSCs have no nexus with any of the 50 states. That is, FSCs generally do not have a 
physical presence within the United States (thus, avoiding substantial nexus).79
However, the potential tax revenue from the export income of FSCs is tempting and 
difficult for some states to disregard. In many cases, the parent companies act on behalf of 
their FSCs in a variety of contractual capacities (i.e., in meeting the foreign economic process 
requirements discussed earlier). Some commentators have suggested the possibility that the 
agency relationships established between a FSC and its parent company could subject the 
FSC’s export profits to state income taxation through attributional nexus.80 In addition, some 
states have found other means to tax the export profits of FSCs, as discussed later, even when 
nexus is lacking.
B. Formulary Apportionment
When an entity (or unitary business as discussed below) has nexus with two or more 
states, formulary apportionment procedures in each state determine the portion of total 
business income over which the states can exercise their jurisdictions to tax. The first step is to 
calculate the apportionable income of the entity as a whole. Apportionable income is the 
entity’s net business income as determined under the state’s law. Many states distinguish 
among allocable and apportionable income. Allocable income, including in many cases income 
not related to business activities, are fully taxable in the state where the company is domiciled, 
and for that reason are separated from otherwise apportionable income items. Dividends are 
generally considered to be allocable income, meaning they are 100 percent taxed where the
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company is domiciled. However, dividends may be subject to apportionment when the recipient 
controls or manages the underlying investment (e.g., dividends from a wholly-owned FSC).81
After bifurcating total income into apportionable and allocable income, a ratio is 
determined for each factor in the state's apportionment formula. The numerator of each ratio 
includes a measure of business activity from within the state, while the denominator of each 
ratio includes the same measure for the entity as a whole.82 Most states use a three-factor 
apportionment formula that equally weights sales, property, and payroll.83 However, a common 
trend among states is to double weight or assign a higher weight to the sales factor. 
Nevertheless, regardless of the weight assigned to the sales factor, the computation of the 
factor itself is typically calculated as a ratio, the numerator of which reflects sales made within 
the state while the denominator includes all sales.84 Similar ratios are determined for property 
and payroll. The average of the ratios, known as the apportionment factor, is multiplied by the 
entity's total apportionable income plus its allocable income to determine how much the 
apportioning state can tax.
Many states apply throwback rules when calculating the sales ratios for the apportionment 
factor. A sales throwback treats an out-of-state sale as a sale in the state of shipment or 
origination if the state where the sale occurs does not tax the transaction (e.g., because of no 
nexus in state of sale or because the state does not have a state corporate income tax). Thus, 
the sales ratio for state A (a throwback state from which merchandise is shipped) for sales 
made into state B (a state imposing no income tax on sales) would include the state B sales 
along with the state A sales in the numerator of the sales ratio for state A. The effect of the 
throwback rule is to allow state A to tax a larger portion of the apportionable income.85
With a few exceptions, most states with throwback rules do not distinguish in their 
application between out-of-state sales within the United States and out-of-state foreign sales. 
Thus, sales abroad that incur no foreign income tax usually are subject to throwback.86 Export
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sales generally are not subject to foreign income tax. Since most FSCs operate on a 
commission basis, the U.S. parent companies of these entities actually make the export sales 
and, accordingly, are subject to throwback rules. Thus, throwback rules can increase the 
apportionment factor and, consequently, state income tax for U.S. exporters in some states.
C. Unitary and Combined Income Reporting
Some states impose income taxes on a unitary business basis. A unitary business is one 
operated as an integrated unit. It is characterized by functional integration, centralized 
management, and economies of scale. Unitary theory focuses on the way a business operates 
rather than on the way it is organized. Thus, two or more affiliated corporations (all separate 
legal entities) that achieve economies of scale through the way they are organized or operated 
can be considered one unitary business and, accordingly, are treated as one taxpayer. In 
states that invoke the unitary business concept, multi-corporate enterprises that meet unitary 
business criteria are required to use combined income reporting methods. Combined income 
reporting is a method of taxing a multi-corporate enterprise carrying on a unitary business in the 
same manner as a single corporation operating through separate divisions.87
When the unitary business principle is required by the state or elected by the entity, either 
a unitary tax return or a combined report must be filed with the state government. It should be 
noted that both returns use the “combined income reporting” method described above. The 
type of return filed depends on the particular state’s administrative requirements. The 
distinction between the two types of reports follows.
A unitary tax return treats and taxes the members of a unitary group as a single taxpayer. 
On the other hand, a combined report is used to determine the proper amount of income 
reportable by each entity engaged in a single unitary business and includable in its separate 
return. Thus, a unitary return involves a single return while the combined report is not a return
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at all and does not relieve any entity from its duty to file a return.88 Though the type of tax 
return used to report a unitary group’s state liability is important for adhering to state 
compliance requirements, the key issue for this analysis is whether the unitary principle can be 
invoked. In the southeastern region of the U.S., none of the states examined mandate unitary 
business principles. However, Georgia and Kentucky can force unitary principles on a case-by- 
case basis. Accordingly, the remainder of this subsection presents a description of how a 
unitary business tax liability is computed for states using unitary taxation principles.
Unitary states determine apportionable income for the unitary business rather than for 
each separate legal entity. In addition, the ratios constituting the apportionment formula are 
computed for the unitary business as a whole, not the separate legal entities comprising the 
unitary business. Thus, unitary states treat separate corporations that are part of the same 
unitary business as one taxable unit.
The unitary method can be applied on either a water’s edge or worldwide basis. Under 
water’s edge reporting, only domestic activities of corporations (i.e., those organized or created 
in the United States) are considered part of a unitary business; activities of foreign corporations 
(in this context, those organized outside the United States) are ignored. In contrast, under 
worldwide income reporting, foreign corporations can be considered part of a unitary business. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the right of a state to require worldwide reporting of a 
domestic parent company and its foreign subsidiaries.89 For practical reasons, however, most 
states with worldwide reporting allow corporations to elect water’s edge reporting instead.
Since a U.S. company generally can elect out of worldwide unitary reporting in those 
states where it applies, it might appear that a parent company with an FSC (which must be 
organized abroad) can always avoid having the FSC included in its unitary business. However, 
this may not always be the case. The business activities of the U.S. company’s other foreign 
subsidiaries might make worldwide reporting more attractive than water’s edge. Also, the
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unitary state might argue that an FSC established in a U.S. possession (e.g., the U.S. Virgin 
Islands) rather than in a foreign country (e.g., Barbados) can be included in the unitary business 
of its parent, even under a water’s edge approach.90
Thus, states applying unitary principles can claim that an FSC (otherwise lacking nexus) is 
part of a unitary business with its corporate shareholder. Though otherwise shielded from state 
taxation, this position may cause a portion of the FSCs export profits to be taxable in the 
combined income or unitary state(s). In the case of a commission FSC (i.e., where the FSC 
income subject to the exemption are commissions from the sale of products rather than direct 
revenues from sales as in a buy-sell FSC), whether the parent company is in a unitary or non- 
unitary state often does not affect the apportionment factor. The parent company makes all the 
sales, and generally the FSC has no property, payroll, or sales in the U.S.; the commission the 
FSC receives is not added to the numerator of the sales ratio since it is a transfer within the 
unitary business and is already reflected in the sales of the parent. However, the commission 
income of the FSC (i.e., its allocable share of export profit) is included in apportionable income 
when the parent company has nexus in a unitary or combined income state and the FSC is 
considered part of the unitary business. Thus, the combined income and the unitary methods 
can increase the state taxation of a domestic corporation and its commission FSC. The effect 
on a U.S. company and its buy/sell FSC is similar.
D. Divergence from Federal Rules
To this point, the discussion has focused on whether any of a FSC’s export profits are 
taxable. In non-combination and non-unitary states, a FSC is not required to file a return as 
long as nexus is lacking and, as discussed in a later section, the FSC is recognized as a bona 
fide entity, separate and distinct from its parent company. In combined income and unitary
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states that use reporting requirements, FSC export profits are subject to tax only if the FSC is 
part of a unitary business with its U.S. parent company.
Thus, the existence of either nexus or a unitary business means that a FSC’s export 
profits are includable in apportionable income. Then the question is how much of the export 
profits should be includable in apportionable income. Some states require that all of a FSC’s 
profits be included, even the 15 to 30 percent of the profits that are exempt from federal income 
tax. Others permit any income exempt from federal taxation to be exempt from state income 
tax also.
Still other states seek means to shift export income away from FSCs to companies with 
nexus. Though the absence of nexus and a unitary business shields FSCs from direct 
taxation,91 states can use methods to allocate income away from FSCs to their parent 
companies that are subject to state taxation. These methods are discussed below.
1. Recognition of Administrative Pricing Rules
Even when both nexus and a unitary business (for states providing for water’s edge 
reporting) is lacking, some states can shift most of the profits otherwise allocable to a FSC to 
the export entity’s domestic parent company with which the state does have nexus. One 
means of shifting the income is to disallow the use of the administrative pricing rules that 
federal law permits. Recall that federal law generally allows a U.S. exporter to allocate either 
23 percent of export profits or the profits allocable to 1.83 percent of export receipts to its FSC.
While recognizing FSCs as separate entities from their parent companies, states that do 
not permit administrative pricing argue that such methods result in an unfair allocation of profit 
between the related entities. Disallowing administrative pricing means that the FSC and its 
domestic parent must use arm’s length pricing. Under arm's length pricing, the FSC can be 
allocated a portion of the export profit commensurate with the economic functions it performs.
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In the great majority of cases, a FSC performs little or no substantial economic function. Thus, 
the use of arm’s length pricing generally allows the FSC little or no profit allocation; that is, the 
bulk of the profit otherwise allocable to the FSC is shifted to the domestic parent company.92 
Income that might otherwise escape state taxation, therefore, becomes taxable to the parent 
company.
2. Deduction of Commissions
Most FSCs are established as commission entities. That is, they do not take physical or 
legal possession of export goods. Instead, FSCs facilitate the export sales of their parent 
companies’ goods and, in return for their services, receive commissions.
Some states do not consider FSCs that perform little or no substantial economic functions 
as bona fide entities. As a result, these states deny deductions to the parent companies for 
commissions paid to their FSCs. Consequently, all of the income otherwise attributable to the 
FSCs (i.e., the commissions) is effectively shifted to their parent companies.93 Rather than 
avoiding state taxation through lack of nexus or a water’s edge unitary business, commissions 
paid to FSCs are, in effect, taxable to the parent companies of these export entities.
3. Allowance of Dividend Received Deduction
For federal purposes, a FSC is a taxable entity, and export profits remitted to a FSC’s 
corporate parent generally are, in effect, exempt. Though the parent company must report FSC 
dividends as gross income, it is entitled to a dividend received deduction equal to the inclusion 
in income.94 Most FSCs annually remit all or nearly all of their export profits as dividends 
because a FSC’s retention and investment of export profits results in some double taxation.95
State laws vary in their tax treatments of dividends between corporations. Some do not 
distinguish between dividends from FSCs and dividends from other entities. Other states have
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special provisions that apply to dividends received from export entities. When a dividend 
received deduction is disallowed (or when a received dividend is only partially deductible), the 
FSC’s commission income is taxable to its corporate parent (in part or in full) when remitted as 
a dividend.
4. Impact of Foreign Source Income
As noted earlier, U.S. taxpayers with excess foreign tax credits for federal purposes often 
are better off exporting without an FSC. While the FSC generally returns a tax benefit of 40 
percent (i.e., 15 percent through the FSC provision and 25 percent through the sourcing rules), 
exporting without an FSC can provide a 50 percent tax benefit through the impact of the 
sourcing rules on the foreign tax credit.
Very few states allow a deduction for foreign income taxes claimed as a credit on the 
federal return.96 Still fewer allow a credit for such taxes. However, several states do allow a 
deduction if foreign tax payments also are claimed as a deduction (rather than as a credit) on 
the federal return.97 In most cases, however, taxpayers prefer to treat foreign income taxes as 
a credit on the federal return. Thus, the federal strategy of exporting without an FSC whenever 
the taxpayer has excess foreign tax credits provides no tax benefits in most states. The next 
section provides a comparative analysis of how the southeastern states tax FSCs, and what 
incentives are provided to exporters.
VI. Comparative Analysis: Southeastern States’ Taxation of FSCs
To facilitate a comparative analysis among the southeastern states, the following 
assumptions have been made:
1. The FSC’s corporate parent has nexus only in the state in question.98
2. All the parent company’s property and payroll are located in the state of nexus.
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3. All export sales are made through the parent's FSC, and all other sales are made 
within the state in question.
4. Export sales are ten percent of total sales.99 (Thus, the apportionment factor is the 
average of one for the property ratio, one for the payroll ratio, and the outcome of 
the sales ratio, which depends on whether a throwback rule applies to FSC sales 
and whether the sales factor is double weighted.)100
5. The states’ highest marginal tax rates are applicable to export sales (in states with 
progressive rate structures).
6. FSCs use the combined taxable income method to calculate the exemption benefit, 
which results in a federal tax benefit of 15 percent.101
A. Alabama
Alabama’s tax law makes no explicit reference to FSCs. Presumably, FSCs and their 
related suppliers are treated the same as other parent-subsidiary groups.
Alabama does not tax on a unitary or combined income basis.102 Foreign corporations 
generally have no nexus with the state unless they do business in or derive income from the 
state.103 However, FSCs may have to file Alabama income tax returns if their parent 
corporations are located within the state.104 Even if a return with Alabama must be filed, the 
state does not tax a foreign corporation’s income from sources outside the state and, thus, 
income allocable to FSCs usually is exempt.105
Though treated as separate corporations, FSCs can be denied use of administrative 
pricing.106 Therefore, all or nearly all export profits can be allocated to FSCs’ parent 
companies. When FSCs distribute their export profits to parent companies with nexus in 
Alabama, no dividend received deduction generally is allowed.107 Nonetheless, since the 
remitted earnings were previously taxed directly to the parent company, no further state income 
tax should result.
Alabama uses an equal weight three-factor apportionment formula.108 The sales factor is 
based on gross receipts and includes dividends received.109 The state’s throwback rule causes
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export sales to be included in the numerator of the sales ratio unless sufficient nexus in the 
foreign country of sale can be demonstrated.110 Thus, the apportionment factor is 100 percent 
after considering the assumptions mentioned earlier, and the state is entitled to tax 100 percent 
of total export profits. At the highest state marginal rate of five percent, the state’s effective 
income tax rate on export profits is five percent.111 See Table 1 for a summary of Alabama’s 
taxation of export profits.
B. Florida
Florida does not permit unitary or combined reporting taxation.112 Thus, any export profits 
allocable to a FSC are not directly taxable in Florida unless the FSC has established nexus in 
that state.
The tax law in Florida contains no provision denying use of administrative pricing for FSCs 
or denying deductions for commissions paid to FSCs.113 Federal law allocates 77 percent of 
export profits to a FSC’s parent company and the residual to the FSC. Therefore, Florida 
permits 23 percent of export profits to be allocable to FSCs. Lacking nexus, Florida does not 
tax FSCs on this 23 percent portion. However, parent companies with nexus in Florida may be 
taxable on the portion of these profits (allocable to FSCs) they receive as dividends from their 
FSCs. To determine the export profits available for dividends, the federal tax imposed on FSCs 
must be considered since this tax reduces the FSC’s earnings and profits available for 
distribution and, consequently, the dividends a parent company receives.
Under federal law, 15/23 of a FSC’s allocable profits or 15 percent of total export profits 
are exempt (i.e., 23 percent allocable to FSC times 15/23 exemption rate). Thus, eight percent 
of total export profits are taxable to the FSC (i.e., 23 percent allocable to FSC less 15 percent 
exemption). Assuming a federal tax rate of 34 percent, the federal tax on a FSC’s export profits
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TABLE 1
STATE TAXATION OF EXPORT PROFITS 
ADMINISTRATIVE PRICING NOT ALLOWED
ALABAMA GEORGIA KENTUCKY LOUISIANA MISSISSIPPI TENNESSEE VIRGINIA
Sales 
Throwback 
Rule Applies
Double 
Weighted 
Sales Factor
Double 
Weighted 
Sales Factor
Equal
Weighted
Factors
Sales 
Throwback 
Rules Applied
Equal
Weighted
Factors
Foreign 
Sales 
Thrown Out
PERCENT OF TOTAL EXPORT PROFIT
Part I - Export Profit of FSC
a. Export profits allocable to 
FSC
0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Part II - Export Profit of 
FSC’s Parent Company
b Export profits allocable to 
parent
100.000% 100.000% 100.000% 100.000% 100.000% 100.000% 100.000%
c. Dividend from FSC 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
d Parent’s dividend received 
deduction
0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0000% 0.000% 0000%
c Apportionable export profits 
(line b + line c - line d)
100.000% 100.000% 100.000% 100.000% 100.000% 100.000% 100 000%
Part III - Effective Tax Rate
f Apportionment factor 100.000% 95 000% 95000% 96.667% 100 000% 96.667% 100 000%
g State's taxable export 
profits 
(Line e * line 0
100.000% 95.000% 95.000% 96.667% 100 000% 96.667% 100.000%
h State’s maximum statutory 
income tax rate
5.000% 6.000% 8.250% 8.000% 5.000% 6.000% 6000%
i. Effective tax rate on export 
profits (line g * line h)
5.000% 5.700% 7.838% 7.733% 5.000% 5.800% 6.000%
are 2.72 percent of total export profits (i.e., 8 percent export profits taxable to FSC times 34 
percent federal tax rate). Thus, the after-federal-tax export profits that are distributed to a 
FSCs parent company are 20.28 percent (i.e., 23 percent allocable to FSC less 2.72 percent of 
federal tax) of total export profits.
When FSCs distribute these profits to their parent companies with nexus in Florida, the 
same dividend received deduction percentage permitted under federal law generally is allowed 
for state income tax purposes.114 Thus, the parent is entitled to a dividend received deduction 
under Florida law equal to the dividend received. The dividend does not increase the parent 
company’s apportionable income. Therefore, only 77 percent of total export profits are included 
in the parent’s apportionable income.
Florida uses a three-factor apportionment formula in which sales are doubled.115 The 
state has no throwback rule; thus, export sales are excluded from the numerator of the sales 
ratio.116 The apportionment factor is 95 percent after considering the assumptions mentioned 
earlier (i.e., 3.8 divided by 4.0), and the state is entitled to tax 73.15 percent of total export 
profits (i.e., 77 percent included in apportionable income times 95 percent apportionment 
factor). At a state income tax rate of 5.5 percent, the state’s effective income tax rate on total 
export profits is 4.023 percent (i.e., 73.15 percent of export profits taxed at highest marginal 
rate of 5.5 percent).117 See Table 2 for a summary of Florida’s taxation of export profits.
C. Georgia
Georgia adopts much of the federal tax law for corporations and piggybacks on the 
federal computation with some minor adjustments.118 Since FSC provisions are reflected in 
federal taxable income, it might appear at first glance that Georgia implicitly adopts the FSC 
provisions and provides significant benefits to U.S. exporters. However, administrative practice
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TABLE 2
STATE TAXATION OF EXPORT PROFITS 
ADMINISTRATIVE PRICING ALLOWED
FLORIDA NORTH
CAROLINA
SOUTH
CAROLINA
WEST
VIRGINIA
Double 
Weighted 
Sales Factor
Double 
Weighted 
Sales Factor
Double 
Weighted 
Sales Factor
Foreign 
Sales 
Thrown Out
PERCENT OF TOTAL EXPORT PROFIT
Part I - Export Profit of FSC
a. Export profits allocable to FSC 
(same as federal)
23.000% 23.000% 23.000% 23.000%
b. Federal exemption (15/23 of line a) 15.000% 15.000% 15.000% 15 000%
c. FSC’s export profits subject to federal 
tax (line a less line b)
8.000% 8.000% 8.000% 8.000%
d. Federal tax on FSC’s share of export 
profits (34% of line c)
2.720% 2.720% 2.720% 2.720%
Part II - Eiport Profit of FSC’s 
Parent Company
e. Export profits allocable to parent 
(same as federal)
77.000% 77.000% 77.000% 77.000%
f. Dividend from FSC 
(Line a less line d)
20.280% 20.280% 20.280% 20 280%
g. Parent’s dividend received deduction 20.280% 20.280% 20.280% 20.280%
h. Profit added back to parent’s taxable 
income (line c), if any
N/A 8.000% N/A N/A
i. Apportionable export profits 
(Line e + line f  - line g + line h)
77.000% 85.000% 77.000% 77.000%
Part m  - Effective Tax Rate
j. Apportionment factor 95.000% 95.000% 96.667% 100.000%
k. State’s taxable export profits 
(line i * line j)
73.150% 80.750% 74.434% 77.000%
1. State’s maximum statutory 
income tax rate
5.500% 7.750% 5.000% 9.000%
m. Effective tax rate on export 
profits (line k * line 1)
4.023% 6.258% 3.722% 6.930%
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often varies from the initial impressions derived from a reading of the statutory law. Such is the 
case here.
Georgia has not adopted unitary or combined reporting tax concepts, per se.119 However, 
on a case-by-case basis the state can force the unitary business concept.120 Since Georgia 
does not subscribe to worldwide reporting for unitary purposes, the taxation of FSCs as 
separate entities depends entirely on whether nexus exists. Under Georgia law, a corporation 
must be doing business within the state for nexus to exist. Doing business includes any 
activities or transactions engaged in for the purpose of profit or gain.121 Since FSCs are 
organized outside the United States, typically conduct all business abroad, and generally 
maintain no U.S. office or U.S. employees, FSCs are not considered to be doing business in 
Georgia. Thus, most FSCs will not have nexus in Georgia and will be exempt from Georgia 
income tax. The fact that a FSC’s parent company, a separate entity, might be organized in or 
doing business in Georgia is irrelevant. Thus, FSCs generally are not taxable under the 
Georgia income tax law. This conclusion is limited to the export profits (if any) allocable to 
these FSC.
Georgia tax law provides that adjustments to a taxpayer’s taxable income can be made to 
clearly reflect income of the entity.122 Further, Georgia does not allow the administrative pricing 
methods normally adopted between FSCs and their parent companies.123 Thus, Georgia can 
require arm’s length pricing to funnel export profits back to the parent company, even though 
the federal tax law permits the generally more favorable administrative pricing structures. This 
disallowance of the administrative pricing rules can ultimately be used to allocate nearly all 
export profits to the Georgia-based parent company of a FSC.
Assuming that 100 percent is allocated to the parent company, the entire export profit 
increases apportionable income. Formulary apportionment procedures are used to determine 
the portion of export profits Georgia can include in taxable income. Apportionable income
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includes all income other than nonbusiness or investment income. Georgia uses a three-factor 
apportionment formula in which sales are doubled. The state has no throwback of either out-of­
state sales or payroll. The sales ratio in the formula is based on gross receipts but does not 
include dividends. Foreign sales are omitted from the numerator but generally are included in 
the denominator.124
Georgia allows a dividend received deduction similar to that available for federal tax 
purposes. Foreign source dividends are treated the same as dividends received from U.S. 
sources.125 However, since arm’s length pricing allocates essentially all export profits to the 
parent company, a FSC is not considered to have any earnings and profits under Georgia law. 
Thus, no portion of dividends received from FSCs should be includable in the recipient parent 
company’s gross income. In summary, Georgia can allocate 100 percent of export profits to a 
FSC’s corporate parent. Almost no export profits are allocable to the FSC; consequently, 
dividends from the FSC would not be included in the parent’s gross income.
Given the stated assumptions above, the sales ratio is equal to 90 percent since no 
throwback rule applies in Georgia. Thus, the apportionment factor is equal to 95 percent (i.e., 
3.8 divided by 4.0), and taxable income from exporting is 95 percent of export profits (100 
percent of export profits times 95 percent). Georgia’s highest statutory tax rate on corporations 
is six percent. Thus, the effective tax rate on export profits from using a FSC is 5.7 percent 
(i.e., 95 percent times six percent). Table 1 summarizes Georgia’s taxation of export profits 
when export sales are through a FSC.
D. Kentucky
Kentucky allows unitary taxation as an option for both taxpayers and the state. The state 
can apply unitary principles on a water’s edge basis whenever a related company is determined 
to be a shell or sham.126 Since FSCs are considered foreign entities, they normally would be
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beyond the reach of a water’s edge approach. However, Kentucky may include a FSC in a 
combined report if organized in a U.S. possession rather than in a foreign country.127
Though Kentucky treats FSCs as separate legal entities, the state denies use of 
administrative pricing.128 Thus, little or no export profits are allocated to most FSCs under state 
law. In this analysis, all export profits are assumed allocable to a FSC’s parent company with 
nexus in Kentucky.
Kentucky uses a three factor apportionment factor in which sales are doubled.129 The 
sales factor includes gross sales receipts in the ordinary course of business but generally does 
not include dividends.130 No throwback rule applies in calculating the sales ratio.131 However, a 
strict destination test applies in determining where sales occur.132 Thus, sales to an 
intermediate Kentucky party that, in turn, will export the property may be considered in-state 
sales. For this analysis, it is assumed that all export sales are destined for some point outside 
the United States. Thus, the apportionment factor is 95 percent (i.e., 3.8 divided by 4.0), and 
95 percent of total export profits are taxable (i.e., 100 percent allocable to parent times 95 
percent apportionment factor).
The highest marginal income tax rate in Kentucky is 8.25 percent.133 Thus, the effective 
tax rate on export profits is 7.8375 percent (i.e., 95 percent of export profits taxable times 8.25 
percent statutory rate). Table 1 summarizes the calculations discussed above.
E. Louisiana
Louisiana does not apply unitary or combined income principles.134 Subsidiaries are 
treated as separate corporations as long as they are "viable."135 Thus, if a FSC is deemed 
inviable, it can be ignored, and its export profits will be attributable to its U.S. parent. Louisiana 
law also reallocates income and expenses when necessary to reflect "true income."136 Even 
when considered a separate entity, a FSC that does not perform substantial economic functions
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may have its export profits reallocated to its U.S. parent company. In addition to these 
possibilities, Louisiana disallows the use of administrative pricing.137 As in other states, the use 
of arm's length pricing generally results in the allocation of almost all export profits to the FSCs 
U.S. parent company.
The apportionment formula in Louisiana follows a three-factor formula with equal 
weights.138 The sales factor includes gross receipts from regular business sales but excludes 
dividends received.139 Foreign sales are included in the denominator of the sales ratio but not 
the numerator.140 Louisiana does not have a sales throwback rule.141 Thus, the apportionment 
factor is 96.667 percent (i.e., 2.9 divided by 3.0), which also is the percentage of export profits 
taxable in Louisiana (i.e., 100 percent allocable to parent times 96.667 percent apportionment 
factor).
Louisiana applies a corporate tax rate of eight percent to taxable incomes of $200,000 or 
more.142 Thus, the effective corporate tax rate on export profits is 7.733 percent (i.e., 96.667 
percent of export profits taxable times eight percent statutory rate). Table 1 summarizes these 
calculations.
F. Mississippi
Though Mississippi can apply water’s edge unitary principles in some situations, it treats 
most corporations as separate entities.143 Thus, FSCs are generally exempt from state income 
taxation. The state is not obligated to follow administrative pricing and, presumably, requires 
arm's length pricing. So even though FSCs are exempt from tax, practically all export profits 
can be allocated away from FSCs to their U.S. parent companies.144
Mississippi uses a three-factor apportionment factor in which the sales factor is doubled 
for retail sales.145 Foreign sales are included in the denominator of the sales ratio but are 
omitted from the numerator.146 However, a sales throwback rule applies to export sales not
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subject to foreign taxation.147 Thus, practically all FSC-related sales are thrown back into the 
numerator of the sales ratio, and the apportionment factor is equal to one.
The statutory income tax rate in Mississippi on taxable income of $10,000 or more is five 
percent.148 Thus, the effective tax rate on export profits is five percent. Table 1 summarizes 
these calculations.
G. North Carolina
FSCs are treated as separate entities in North Carolina; unitary reporting is not allowed.149 
FSCs must file a return when their parents are located within the state, even if there is no 
nexus.150 However, FSCs lacking nexus should be exempt from state taxation.
North Carolina accepts administrative pricing rules, and deductions are not denied for 
commissions paid to FSCs. Thus, 23 percent of export profits are attributable to FSCs in North 
Carolina. As in Florida, 15/23 of a FSC's allocable profits are exempt. Only 8/23 of the FSCs 
profits are taxable. Thus, the federal tax on the FSCs profits is 2.72 percent of total export 
profits (i.e., 34 percent federal tax rate times eight percent of total export profits).
The after-tax earnings and profits are 20.28 percent of total export profits (i.e., 23 percent 
allocable profits less 2.72 percent of total profits paid as taxes), which are remitted as 
dividends. North Carolina does not follow the dividend received deduction procedure of federal 
law.151 The federal deduction for dividends received is added back to taxable income; then, a 
state-determined dividend received deduction is subtracted.152 This deduction is the same for 
dividends received from FSCs as it is for dividends from other corporations.153 When a parent 
company commercially domiciled in North Carolina receives a dividend from a 50 percent- 
controlled subsidiary, the state permits a 100 percent dividend received deduction.154
Notwithstanding the rules above, North Carolina can require that a FSCs parent company 
add back to its own taxable income the net profits of the FSC (presumably after considering the
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FSC tax exemption).155 Thus, the apportionable export profits will be 85 percent of total export 
profits (i.e., 77 percent profits allocable to parent company plus 20.28 percent of export profits 
received as a dividend less a dividend received deduction equal to the dividend received plus 
the eight percent of the FSCs federal taxable profits).
North Carolina uses a three-factor apportionment factor that doubles the sales ratio.1S6 
Foreign sales are included in the denominator (but not the numerator) of the sales ratio.157 
North Carolina does not use a sales throwback rule.158 Thus, the apportionment factor under 
the assumptions mentioned earlier is 95 percent (i.e., 3.8 divided by 4.0). The state taxes 
80.75 of export profits (i.e., 85 percent of export profits apportionable to parent company times 
95 percent apportionment factor). The state's corporate income tax rate is 7.75 percent.159 
Thus, the effective income tax rate on export profits is 6.258 percent (i.e., 80.75 percent of 
export profits times 7.75 percent statutory tax rate). Table 2 summarizes these calculations.
H. South Carolina
South Carolina is not a unitary principle state; absent nexus, FSCs are exempt from 
taxation.160 Administrative pricing is allowed.161 Other methods that some states use to shift 
income from a FSC to its U.S. parent are not used in South Carolina. As with several other 
states that recognize the federal allocation of export profits, 77 percent of export profits are 
allocable to the U.S. parent company, and the after-federal-tax earnings and profits of the FSC 
available for dividends is 20.28 percent of total export profits.
South Carolina follows the federal treatment of dividends received.162 The dividend 
received deduction completely offsets the dividends received. Thus, the parent company's 
apportionable export profits are 77 percent.
South Carolina uses a three-factor, equally-weighted apportionment factor.163 The sales 
ratio does not consider dividends received.164 The numerator of the sales ratio excludes foreign
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sales even though these sales do appear in the denominator.165 South Carolina does not use a 
sales throwback rule.166 Thus, the apportionment factor is 96.667 percent (i.e., 2.9 divided by 
3.0). The state taxes 74.434 percent of total export profits (i.e., apportionable export profits of 
77 percent times the 96.667 apportionment factor). At the state's flat corporate tax rate of five 
percent, the effective tax rate on export profits is 3.722 percent (i.e., taxable export profits of 
74.434 percent times the five percent statutory rate).167 Table 2 summarizes these calculations.
I. Tennessee
Tennessee does not follow unitary principles but treats FSCs as separate corporations.168 
If nexus does not exist, any income allocable to a FSC, with a parent company in Tennessee, is 
exempt from the state income tax.
However, survey data indicate that the state will not follow FSC administrative pricing 
rules.169 Assuming arm's length pricing, virtually all export profit is allocable to FSC parent 
companies organized in Tennessee. Since all export profit is allocable to parent companies of 
FSCs, any dividend from export profits is ignored.
Tennessee's apportionment factor is composed of three equally-weighted factors.170 
Foreign sales are included in the denominator but not the numerator.171 No throwback rule 
applies to sales.172 Thus, the apportionment factor is 96.667 percent (i.e., 2.9 divided by 3.0), 
and 96.667 percent of total export profits are subject to state income taxation (i.e., 100 percent 
of export profits apportioned times the apportionment factor of 96.667 percent).
The state income tax rate is a flat six percent.173 When multiplied by the portion of export 
profits subject to Tennessee taxation, an effective tax rate of 5.8 percent results (i.e., 96.667 
percent of taxable export profits times statutory tax rate of six percent). Table 1 summarizes 
these calculations.
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J. Virginia
Virginia has not adopted unitary taxation.174 Each entity is treated separately, including 
FSCs. Thus, most FSCs are not subject to the Virginia income tax.
Nonetheless, Virginia may require that non-arm's length transactions between a FSC and 
its parent company be adjusted to clearly reflect income.175 Assuming that arm's length pricing 
is imposed, practically all export profits are allocable to the parent company organized in 
Virginia.
Virginia uses an equally-weighted, three-factor apportionment factor.176 No throwback rule 
applies.177 Unlike most states, however, foreign sales are excluded from both the numerator 
and denominator.178 Based on the earlier assumption that export sales are ten percent of total 
sales, the apportionment factor is one (i.e., 2.9 divided by 2.9).
The corporate income tax rate in Virginia is a flat six percent.179 Thus, the effective tax 
rate on total export profits is six percent (i.e., 100 percent of export profits subject to taxation in 
Virginia times the statutory tax rate of six percent). Table 1 summarizes these calculations.
K. West Virginia
In West Virginia, taxpayers can request unitary treatment and, in some cases, West 
Virginia can force taxpayers to adopt the unitary method on a water’s edge basis.180 Since 
FSCs are foreign entities, they should not be included in unitary reporting. Thus, FSCs are 
exempt from West Virginia taxation.
The state does allow administrative pricing between a FSC and its U.S. parent 
company.181 Thus, 23 percent of export profits is allocable to FSCs for state purposes. After 
payment of the federal income tax on the non-exempt portion of the FSCs allocable profit, 
20.28 percent of the total export profits is available for distribution to the U.S. parent. West 
Virginia follows the federal law's treatment of dividends received. Thus, dividends received
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from a wholly-owned subsidiary are offset with a 100 percent dividend received deduction.182 
The fact that the dividend is from a subsidiary beyond the reach of state income taxation is 
irrelevant. In summary, 77 percent of the total export profits is apportionable income.
West Virginia follows a three-factor apportionment formula that doubles the sales ratio.183 
Sales not subject to taxation in the state of destination, however, are thrown out of both the 
numerator and the denominator of the sales ratio.184 Thus, the apportionment ratio is one (i.e., 
4 divided by 4). Seventy-seven percent of the total export profits are subject to taxation in West 
Virginia (i.e., apportionable income equal to 77 percent of total export profits times an 
apportionment factor of one).
The corporate income tax rate in West Virginia is a flat nine percent.185 The effective tax 
rate on export profits is 6.93 percent (i.e., 77 percent of export profits that are taxable times the 
statutory tax rate of nine percent). Table 2 summarizes these calculations.
L. Summary and Sensitivity Analysis
Table 1 summarizes the calculation of effective tax rates for all states not allowing 
administrative pricing for FSCs. In contrast, the calculations for all states that do allow 
administrative pricing appears in Table 2. A review of Table 1 reveals that the use of a FSC for 
exporting reduces the effective rate of taxation very little or not at all for the seven southeastern 
states listed (i.e., when comparing the last two rows). On average, the use of a FSC reduces 
the effective tax rate in these seven states by 2.7 percent. In contrast, the effective tax rate in 
the four states appearing in Table 2 (where administrative pricing is allowed) is, on average, 
23.2 percent lower when a FSC is used.
Figure 1 summarizes the effective tax rate imposed on export profits in each southeastern 
state under two scenarios. The first scenario assumes export sales of 10 percent, while the
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second scenario assumes export sales of 40 percent. The purpose of increasing the export 
sales is to determine the sensitivity of the effective tax rate to this factor.
When exports are 10 percent of total sales, the highest effective tax rates are found in 
Kentucky and Louisiana at 7.838 and 7.733 percent, respectively. The lowest rates are in 
South Carolina and Florida at 3.722 and 4.023 percent, respectively. The average effective tax 
rate among the Southeastern states is 5.819 percent. When exports are 40 percent of total 
sales, the change lowered most effective tax rates across the southeast because of its effect on 
the apportionment factor. However, the change had little impact on the overall order. The 
lowest effective tax rates continued to be in South Carolina and Florida at 3.337 and 3.388 
percent, respectively. The highest effective tax rates, however, resulted in Louisiana and West 
Virginia at 6.933 and 6.930 percent, respectively. The average effective tax rate became 5.351 
percent.
VII. Should States Provide More Incentives to Export Activities
This section discusses a simple strategy to provide tax incentives for corporations 
domiciled in southeastern states to export. However, the revenue costs of the suggested 
change and its effectiveness also must be considered.
A. Impact of Proposed Change on Exports and Employment
To attract or maintain FSC operations, southeastern states that currently disallow use of 
the federal administrative pricing laws can amend their statutes to explicitly allow such rules. 
This change in policy would make apportionable export profits 77 percent of total export profits 
(as opposed to 100 percent under current law) and effectively decrease the effective tax rates 
on exports. Since companies are assumed to be as sensitive to tax reductions as they are to 
any other decline in business expenses, this policy change would presumably function as an
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incentive for domiciled corporations to increase exporting activities. The U.S. Treasury 
Department used this assumption to estimate the impact of the FSC program on U.S. 
exports.186
The U.S. Treasury Department estimated that the federal tax exemption for FSCs 
increased U.S. exports by $1.2 billion in 1987.187 The applicable federal tax rate in 1987 for 
corporations was 36 percent. Under the combined taxable income method of allocating export 
profits, the effective tax rate on the export profits of a U.S. company with a FSC was 30.6 
percent (i.e., 36 percent statutory rate times 85 percent taxable portion of export profits). Thus, 
a 5.4 percentage point reduction in the federal tax rate (i.e., 36 percent statutory rate less the 
30.6 percent effective tax rate on export profits) stimulated the $1.2 billion increase in U.S. 
exports. Assuming a linear relationship between these variables, each percentage point drop in 
the effective tax rate resulted in a $222 million increase in exports (i.e., $1.2 billion divided by 
5.4). A similar procedure could be performed to estimate the impact for state tax purposes.
In addition, Federal estimates are that every $1 billion in U.S. exports support 19,000 
domestic jobs.188 Thus, the potential to increase domestic employment within each state serves 
as an incentive for state governments to consider developing a more “tax friendly" environment 
for U.S. exporters.
B. Impact of Proposed Change on State Tax Revenues
The above incentives certainly do not come without economic trade-offs. Since the 
effective tax rate on corporations drops, there is a resulting decrease in revenue. However, the 
decrease in corporate tax revenue could, to some extent, be offset by the increase in other 
revenues associated with the increase in employment and economic activity in the state. 
Unfortunately, generalizations about the net effect of such proposed changes are not possible.
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Revenue impacts must be computed on a state-by-state basis. For example, states with 
individual income taxes stand a better chance of revenue offsets from increased employment.
A harder question to answer is whether states should offer tax incentives to particular 
activities rather than just lowering taxes across the board and, more particularly, whether states 
should offer tax incentives to export activities as opposed to domestic activities. Nonetheless, 
in recent years, many states, in particular southeastern states, have invested substantial 
resources in attracting new business. With this behavior toward domestic (within the United 
States) business activities, state governments are engaged in a zero-sum game, or actually a 
negative-sum game given the business development transaction costs. The provision of 
incentives for export activities are collectively more in the nature of a positive-sum game. Thus, 
the above proposals do not appear to run contrary to the desired economic development of 
these states and make more sense for the country as a whole.
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